Where is Cyprus’ National Security Strategy?

When one discusses the security aspect of the Cyprus issue it is not long before there is talk of the Treaty of Guarantee, a guarantee whereby foreign powers provide security to Cypriots. In Cyprus, the answer to security always seems to lie abroad as far as Cypriots are concerned. This is no more evident than in the period 1963-1974, where the role of the state in providing security was unacceptably weak. But even today when pondering changes to current security arrangement provided by the Treaty of Guarantee, Cypriots look abroad at what foreign powers can do for us but rarely do we look internally. But with negotiations on the way and a shared state once again on the agenda, what about our own responsibilities and duties as Cypriots to protect our state?

TREATY OF GUARANTEE

Upon the formation of the Republic of Cyprus following the London – Zurich Agreements of 1959, the three Guarantor powers Britain, Greece and Turkey were granted the right to intervene to safeguard the Cypriot Republic and thus the interests of its citizens, and to restore it if and when the new state is ever in turmoil. The concept seemed sensible at the time giving Cypriots, particularly Greek and Turkish –speaking Cypriots a kind of assurance that their security was taken care of. In essence it was a kind of insurance cover in case things went wrong. Predictably, like consumers who keep their insurance details safe, Cypriots sat back and relied on their insurance, while falling dangerously lax on preventative measures to evade using the insurance altogether.

INTER-COMMUNAL CONFLICT

As inter-communal violence sparked up three years after the setting up of the Cypriot Republic, Turkish Cypriots called their insurance company in 1963 while Greek Cypriots reached for their policy number in 1974. Without entering the blame game, which is not my intention in this piece, during the period 1963 – 1974 attacks by EOKA B forced many Turkish Cypriots to move into enclaves scattered throughout the island and left many more quivering with trepidation and betrayal. The fear was justified. Some Turkish Cypriot families would have their menfolk taken away; others such as those in Tochni / Taskent were massacred by EOKA B militiamen forcing many more elsewhere to move into enclaves out of fear.  Turkish Cypriots often remind those discussing 1974 that they became displaced 10/11 years before Greek and Maronite Cypriots and lived in poor conditions in enclaves as a forgotten minority with few prospects for a better future. There were of course many Turkish Cypriots who continued to coexist peacefully with Greek Cypriots with many companionships, friendships and love stories which led to many reunions 40 years later. But lawlessness and disorder created by paramilitary activity soured even this as paramilitary groups EOKA B and TMT frequently played on people’s fears to promote partition and even murdered their own people in order to divide the communities.

POOR GOVERNANCE AND NO NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

With such internal anarchy caused by paramilitary groups, one is compelled to ask: Where is Cyprus’ armed forces to keep the peace? What civil defense and emergency preparedness measures had been invoked? Where were the police and intelligence services to detect and defeat or avoid threats? And what role did the counter-intelligence and secret police fulfil to protect the nation?

Unfortuntely, these were either lacking or were monopolised and manipulated by one community against the other. Poor governance marked by a series of bad political decisions by President Makarios, weakened Cyprus both internally and externally. Makarios’ 13 amendments destroyed power sharing between the two communities was not only unconstitutional but pushed away Turkish Cypriots from the Cyprus government into the arms of TMT. An ex- Enosis – union with Greece supporter himself, Makarios failed to promote allegiance by Cypriots for the Cypriot Republic thus failing to control the state’s police and armed forces from EOKA B.   As the armed forces could not be separated from EOKA B, Turkish Cypriots who were under attack prior to 1974 rapidly lost faith in their state causing difficulty in domestic peacekeeping – a key role of the armed forces. As the army could not be separated from paramilitary groups they could not trusted by some communities and effective civil defense and emergency preparedness measures and anti-terrorist measures could not be planned in an island-wide, inter-communal coordinated manner. With everything divided at an ethnic level, intelligence and secret police activities would have been difficult to coordinate on a national level.

As can be anticipated, the failure of the Cyprus government from 1963-1974 to do anything to stop paramilitary groups or to distance themselves from EOKA B led to its eventual down fall. This failure had enormous costs for Cyprus, leading to the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriot deputies of the Cyprus House of Representatives resulting in the loss of confidence by Turkish Cypriots in their Cyprus government. This had the contrary effect of strengthening pro-partition TMT. In the end it was the failure to stop these paramilitary groups that led to militants like Nicos Sampson overthrowing the Cyprus government in a coup which lead the way to Turkey’s intervention / invasion and 34 years of partition.

Paramilitary groups that caused lawlessness and disrupted public order could thus not be stopped. A weak response by the state to the internal threats of paramilitary groups effectively legalized criminality and vigilantism, causing internal chaos and disunity, while losing the confidence of a great many Cypriots of Turkish descent. The state’s lack of response was interpreted as “you are on your own.” Makarios’ weakness to maintain unity, coupled with strained relations with the West and an antagonised Turkey, at a time when Greece was under military rule was a recipe for partition. Dangerous, this laid the setting and created the climate for the events of 1974.

GOOD GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Looking at the past, we could play the blame game, which has been done a million times over and which is counterproductive, or we could take lessons from our errors. For me, what the events of 1963-1974 show are not that Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together neither does it ‘prove’ that they cannot trust one another but it exposes the danger of poor governance where mono-communal interests cannot be separated from the governing of the state combined with a failure to stop paramilitary groups and provide internal security. History dictates that a future Cyprus will need a National Security Strategy; Cypriots have had many lessons from the past, of threats not just external but internal so it is only fitting that these are learnt so that its people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence, in a more secure, stable and prosperous Cyprus. Every state including Britain has a National Security Strategy that is developed and enhanced as lessons are learnt from experience. And now even though Cyprus has changed – nationalism is dying, many of the past threats have long disappeared, the paramilitary groups are now dormant if not dismantled completely and today’s “Euro Cypriots” mix without incident, preventative measures must be taken by the future state to prevent a repeat of the past and to protect the new Cyprus. Cypriots must not and cannot allow any laxity in their own security responsibilities and duties by relying on foreign powers to police their state, which itself undermines the sovereignty of the state. Rather than moving closer to the ‘motherlands’ in times of crises, Cypriots must quickly but reliably think as Cypriots shedding away any political, ethnic, linguistic or religious differences to maintain law and order, and unity.